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Ten years after it joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Chinahas still not become the country dreamed of by the Western govern-ments with whom long negotiations on the conditions of its mem-
bership were conducted and who communicated to the public their
enthusiasm for the prospects offered by the Chinese market. (1) Indeed, 2001
was a time of optimism, and in the spirit of the creation of the WTO at the
1994 Marrakech Conference, China seemed to be the missing link in what
was envisaged as a cutting-edge organisation in terms of development to-
wards increased international regulation. Today, China’s economic develop-
ment is as worrying as it is fascinating. Its political system has not followed
the developments that certain observers anticipated in terms of greater in-
tegration into the international system, the opening-up of its market re-
mains partial, and above all, the virtues of free trade shine less brightly in
people’s minds, as the failure of the Doha cycle testifies. Change and the
permanence of the system intersect, rendering an analysis and assessment
of China’s membership all the more difficult.
This article sets out to retrace some of the developments that have taken
place in China since it joined the WTO from the point of view of the mod-
ernisation of its legal framework and business practices. Necessarily sub-
jective, the analysis aims to identify both the progress made and the
resistance encountered. (2) At the end of this ten-year period, legal insecurity
remains, in fact, one of the main problems raised in various surveys carried
out on the mood of foreign companies present in China. (3) The transparency
requirements at the heart of WTO regulations are often demolished by the
discretionary practices of the Chinese government, whilst the opacity
shrouding certain markets, when added to persistent corruption, often gives
foreign companies the feeling that they cannot operate within a framework
of fair competition. The principle of national treatment has led to the revi-
sion of numerous legal provisions and to an almost total harmonisation of
the system applicable to companies operating in China, but here again, its
application has met with many failures since the discriminatory implemen-
tation of regulations for foreign and foreign-invested companies, to the ex-
tent of excluding the latter from the public markets of the future. The
principle of judicial review exists in theory, but few and far between are the
foreign companies that would risk going to court over an illegal government
decision prejudicial to them.
Nonetheless, the Chinese market remains at the heart of the priorities of
most multinational companies, who see it as a means of growth compared
to markets that are mature, stagnant, or depressed. The balance sheet of
some of them is beginning to show a significant weight of business carried
out in China. An ambivalence continues to exist between the promises of a
vast market that have been vaunted since the beginning of the reform and
opening policy, and the problems of finding a place or developing in it. The
legal framework has undeniably been modernised thanks to China’s mem-
bership of the WTO, a guarantee of the disappearance of certain practices
in an economy that was previously entirely planned. Yet it is difficult to dis-
cern a “WTO spirit” that might lead China to open up its market over and
above the commitments it made and to abstain from playing on the letter
of these commitments in order to favour Chinese companies at the expense
of foreign businesses. Apart from the rules and principles of the WTO, the
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question remains of whether the obstacles with which foreign companies
are confronted are simply the result of the immaturity of a rapidly growing
market, or of far more deeply-rooted structural obstacles and the impossi-
bility of the current regime implementing the rule of law that it nevertheless
continues to preach.
A new modernisation phase thanks to WTO
membership
Hopes linked to China’s membership of the WTO were running high ten
years ago, proportionate with the years of negotiation – almost 15 – that
had preceded it. The Chinese displayed an obvious desire to become inte-
grated in world affairs, thereby avoiding the annual humiliation of the re-
newal process of the most favoured nation clause by the United States and
protecting themselves, through the purchase of a multilateral insurance pol-
icy, against unilateral retaliation in necessarily conflictual trade relations.
Over and above this, the strategy in certain governmental circles was to
use this membership to make the reform and opening up policy irreversible,
in order to force state-owned enterprises to reform and other government
sectors to adapt their policies under a certain form of “external constraint.”
Foreign expectations were also very high, with the prospect of a fall in
customs duties and a far more extensive opening up of the market. Certain
parties counted on the WTO to overcome the “internal barriers” that split
the Chinese market into numerous provincial and local markets. (4) Moreover,
in most people’s minds, accession to the WTO was synonymous with a re-
inforcement of the rule of law that would lead to greater legal security and
a gradual bringing into line of practices current on the Chinese market, no-
tably with regard to intellectual property.
There exist several ways of interpreting the reasons that led developed
countries to accept China’s entry into the WTO at the beginning of the cen-
tury. One of these interpretations is that although Western governments
had realised the extent of industrial capacity transfers to China and of the
trade balances, permanently in deficit, that would have to be taken on
board, they thought they would find a form of compensation in the Chinese
market since it would provide new outlets for their companies – in short,
exchanging the deindustrialisation taking place in Europe and the United
States for investments in an increasingly dynamic Chinese market, and ac-
cepting Schumpeterian “creative destruction” in favour of business activities
with greater added value that could maintain the position of Western com-
panies within a context of globalisation. It was a wager that could be justi-
fied by comparing the situation in China to that of other countries. Unlike
India, China has favoured the widespread implantation of foreign groups on
its soil since the beginning of the reform and opening policy, judging cor-
rectly that such investments are the best guarantee of massive technology
transfers. Moreover, there are not so many countries in the world that pos-
sess both real domestic market potential and an industrial base for export.
Have the promises of the wager been kept?
The question of trading rights
One of the main obstacles for foreign companies before China joined the
WTO was the question of import and trading rights. Importing foreign prod-
ucts had to be done by specialist intermediaries holding an import-export
licence, and they alone were authorised to deal in foreign currencies, whilst
foreign-invested companies could only import the equipment and compo-
nents needed to make their products, and could only export or sell on the
local market products they had made themselves. The system was com-
pleted by the ban on setting up foreign-invested commercial companies.
As a result, the system forced companies to invest in industrial capacity in
order to sell their own products on the Chinese market and prevented them
from developing and managing distribution networks for products manu-
factured abroad.
The dismantling of this system, incompatible with the rules of the WTO,
was officially set down during the negotiations. We can only admire the
way in which China has handled the transition. From the beginning of the
1990s, import-export rights were granted to an increasing number of Chi-
nese companies. (5) The initial monopoly of several big national import-ex-
port corporations (6) has been relaxed, to the point where at the end of the
decade, end-users forced many local import agents to go into competition
while working for steadily diminishing commissions. From 1998-1999, a
system developed on the sidelines of national regulations in the free trade
zone of Waigaoqiao in Shanghai, with the tacit support of the authorities.
It allowed foreign companies to set up trading companies in this zone (usu-
ally simply a business address), to import their products there, and to invoice
these in local currency to clients outside the zone. At the same time, “pilot”
regulations were brought in to allow minority foreign investment in a few
department stores, and distribution chains such as Carrefour could, with the
support of local authorities, take the risk of defying the national authorities
and begin to develop hypermarkets.
On 11 December 2001, the date on which China was to begin implement-
ing its commitments, people were therefore prepared for the disappearance
of the trading rights system inherited from the planned economy. The nego-
tiations preceding entry into the WTO were particularly precise on matters
of distribution, since China’s commitments covered not only import and trad-
ing rights, accessible to all companies whether purely Chinese or foreign-
owned (except for a few designated products such as books), but also most
services linked to distribution. At the end of 2004, foreign companies were
authorised to set up companies funded entirely by foreign capital whose sole
object was the marketing of products manufactured in China or abroad. (7)
The current freedom of distribution system is now so widespread that the
harsh restrictions foreign companies used to face have been forgotten: apart
from the obligation to use intermediaries to import their products onto the
Chinese market (with recourse to legal proceedings limited to these inter-
mediaries when the end client did not pay the entire sum due), there was
the use of local distributors who were difficult to control, and even of front-
men for those foreign operators who tried to build embryonic distribution
networks or open shops.
Today, China’s marketing system is by and large similar to that of the de-
veloped countries, and the restrictions encountered by foreign companies
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are more likely to be of a commercial rather than of a legal nature. Fierce
competition reigns on the Chinese market, and certain forms of distribution
that are current in Europe (for example, distribution chains specialising in
DIY products or furnishings) have difficulty gaining a foothold in the face
of traditional, more unsophisticated forms where price is of paramount im-
portance.
Harmonisation of regulations and government
reforms
Membership of the WTO corresponded to acceleration in the enormous
task of legislation begun in the mid-1980s. The Chinese authorities amended
or carried over almost 300 regulatory texts of national scale, (8) without
counting the immense amount of work carried out at the provincial and
municipal levels. Most frequently however, these legislative and regulatory
developments only concerned existing measures that contradicted the rules
of the WTO or the commitments made by China in the Accession Protocol,
with legislative work then gradually gathering momentum to construct,
stage by stage, an increasingly comprehensive legal system.
In more general terms, the system applicable to foreign-invested enter-
prises became almost identical to that of purely domestic companies. (9)
Labour law applies to all, (10) as does fiscal and contract law. Company law
is almost always common to both, with the exception of texts applicable
to Sino-foreign joint ventures that conserve certain specificities as com-
pared to the company law (and notably, the requirement for unanimity in
the Board and for the administrative approval of the most important ques-
tions, a guarantee of protection for minority interests). (11) Regulations that
were previously vital for foreign investors, such as those applying to tech-
nology transfers, (12) have disappeared or are no longer important.
The harmonisation of the Chinese legal framework was also accompanied
in the first decade of the century by multi-form government reforms that
significantly improved the situation of foreign companies. The principle of
transparency led to the abandonment of internal regulations (neibu guid-
ing), which up until then could be applied to foreign companies in a discre-
tionary manner. Even in the absence of a national Official Journal, access
to regulations is public and made easier by the many websites published
by ministries and regulatory authorities. (13) On-line administration is, in cer-
tain sectors, way ahead of Europe. Hotlines give access to competent civil
servants who can be questioned on the application of such and such regu-
lation, and these same government departments are generally available to
deal with many questions during meetings. Civil servants are now younger,
with the appointment of 40-year-olds to management posts in all local and
provincial government departments. Better trained than their predecessors,
they approach problems in a much more professional manner, and the ar-
guments they develop are most often based on regulatory texts. This change
of attitude is often expressed by answers such as, “You can do it because
it’s not forbidden by the regulations,” replacing the “It’s impossible because
it is not mentioned in the regulations” of times gone by.
China’s accession to the WTO has also strengthened the determination
of the central government to pursue other reforms launched before 2001,
such as reform of state-owned enterprises and financial institutions. Vali-
dated by the 15th Congress of the CCP in 1997, the policy of reforming
state-owned enterprises consisted of “grasping the large (companies) and
releasing the small” (zhuada fangxiao), resulting in the large-scale restruc-
turing of tens of thousands of factories and concentrating the most strategic
assets (energy, car manufacturing, steel and non-ferrous metals, aeronautics
and space, chemicals, etc.), that is to say, almost 70 percent of the assets
then held by the state, in several large companies supervised by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Simi-
larly, the streamlining of the financial system involved the confinement in
default companies of non-performing loans that encumbered the balance
sheets of Chinese banks. These fundamental reforms unquestionably con-
tributed to the modernisation of the Chinese economy and to the mainte-
nance of a high growth rate during the first decade of the century. Alongside
this, the focusing of the administrative authorities on regulatory activities
and the conversion of former administrative units into professional associ-
ations or independent service companies (for example for commodity in-
spection, engineering, or architecture) has also contributed to the creation
of a more open market, even if historic links and personal relationships be-
tween former colleagues in the administration are still at the origin of many
conflicts of interest.
Commitments largely respected
These administrative reforms allowed China to respect the letter of the
commitments it had made in terms of market access for foreign companies.
Set out in the Accession Protocol and its appendixes, these commitments
have been copied into the successive versions of the Foreign Investment
Catalogue, a tool in which the Ministry of Commerce enumerates a series
of production processes for which foreign investment is forbidden, encour-
aged, or restricted. Activities that do not appear in the Catalogue are con-
sidered authorised by default. Foreign investment in categories of products
or services identified as “restricted” is conditional upon the creation of joint
ventures, sometimes with a majority Chinese shareholding, and/or a specific
process of approval that takes the case to the national authorities. The latest
version of the Catalogue, published on-line in April 2011 to gather com-
ments and finally published on 24 December 2011, (14) corresponds to the
declared national policies by listing in the “encouraged” category many ac-
tivities linked to the protection of the environment and “green” industries.
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The Chinese authorities have, in general, not ventured beyond the com-
mitments to market opening set out in the Accession Protocol. This situation
has caused a great deal of frustration amongst those who imagined that
access to the WTO was the beginning of a process that would lead China
to open up still further. (15) Certain foreign operators are watching the rapid
development of the Chinese market without being able to access it effec-
tively, in particular in the service sector. Service activities are developing
rapidly, and their reality no long necessarily corresponds to the nomencla-
ture used during the accession negotiations 15 years ago. This is this case,
for example, for new activities linked to information technologies.
Cases where China has opened up its market to a greater extent than
planned ten years ago are rare. Nonetheless, a notable example is the case
of travel agents providing services for Chinese tourists travelling outside
China (outbound tourism). The WTO Accession Protocol envisaged the grad-
ual opening up of the market to foreign travel agents, but only for foreign
tourists visiting China (inbound tourism), or to provide services within China
itself (domestic tourism). Tours abroad can only be sold by agencies holding
a special licence delivered by the National Tourism Administration. In 2010,
for the first time, the number of Chinese tourists travelling abroad (57 mil-
lion) exceeded that of foreign tourists visiting China (55 million), (16) sharp-
ening the appetite of big foreign tour operators, some of whom had begun
to provide this type of service through complex, scarcely legal arrangements
aimed at circumventing the regulations (use of a Chinese partner’s licence
or takeover of a Chinese company that holds such a licence, for example).
In May 2011, the National Tourist Administration issued for the first time
three outbound tourism licences to foreign operators as part of a “pilot”
project of the sort that often heralds a more general relaxation of the rules.
In this particular sector, one can imagine that several factors contributed
to an unexpected opening up of the market: the rapid development of the
market, which allowed everyone to find a place in it, the demand of Chinese
clients for world travel under the same conditions as foreigners, new sys-
tems that allow tourists to reserve the tours of their choice via Internet,
and the possibility of circumventing the ban that justified working with it
rather than submitting to it.
The difficulties of accessing the market
Ten years after WTO membership, have foreign companies found com-
pensations in the Chinese market for the increased competition from Chi-
nese products on foreign markets? The answer to this question doubtless
varies from sector to sector. Overall, foreign companies that develop a sig-
nificant and profitable part of their activities in China, visible on their bal-
ance-sheet, either by exporting there or by manufacturing locally, belong
to certain sectors: luxury goods and cosmetics, wine and certain alcohols,
automobiles, (17) Airbus and Boeing in the aeronautics sector, basic products,
energy resources and raw materials that supply Chinese industry, electronic
components mainly made in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea and then used in Chi-
nese products, and certain manufacturing equipment that allows countries
occupying a good position in this sector, such as Germany, to take full ad-
vantage of Chinese growth. On the other hand, there are many sectors in
which foreign operators only have access to a fraction of the Chinese mar-
ket: banking and insurance (around 2 percent of the market share), energy
and transport (due to the presence of Chinese competitors for whom the
big contracts are reserved), telephone operators (still the preserve of three
Chinese operators anxious not to share a profitable market), the construc-
tion sector (1 percent of the market share (18)), and many other professional
service markets. Since China has overtaken Germany as the world’s leading
exporter, and competition from its products figures amongst the main
causes of the growing de-industrialisation of certain Western countries, was
its membership of the WTO nothing more than a front? And if China has
by and large respected the letter of its access commitments to the WTO,
why do foreign companies have so much difficulty finding their place on
the Chinese market?
The absence of a business freedom principle
When attempting to analyse the obstacles faced by foreign companies in
China, first and foremost it has to be said that the absence of a freedom of
commerce and industry principle in Chinese regulations and administrative
practices forms the background to very many difficulties. It is perhaps one
of the most striking paradoxes that a country where the principles of a cap-
italist economy often operate in a rather abrupt manner is also a country
that has preserved an administration that approves, controls, and regulates
business activities.
China maintains a strict system of approval for foreign investments, what-
ever form they take. Foreign-owned companies can only be set up after ap-
proval by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), or more often, by its local
or provincial representatives. This control concerns both the business scope
of the projected company and its investment plans. If these affect regulated
sectors or are covered by national policies (steel, aeronautics, car manufac-
turing, etc.), or exceed certain sums, the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC, formerly the Planning Commission) must study and
approve the project before it can be implemented. In the financial services
sector, regulatory authorities have been set up (19) to approve and supervise
activities of banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions fi-
nanced by foreign capital. For simpler projects, such as the creation of a
commercial subsidiary or a factory for the manufacture of non-regulated
products, approval is at local level and is usually given fairly quickly. How-
ever, over the years, there has been an increase in the requirements of the
authorities regarding the documents to be provided, their conformity to
standards that differ from one municipality to another, and the formal re-
quirements applicable to some of them.
Verification of the business scope by the authorities is fairly emblematic
in this respect. Unlike Western countries, in which the creation of a company
is a formality and the business scope of companies is simply a stylistic de-
vice that allows them to carry out all manner of activities, China applies a
restrictive business scope principle when the company is founded (verifica-
tion that a foreign capital company has been set up for activities authorised
by the Catalogue) and also carries out an annual inspection that allows the
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China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
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Administration for Industry and Commerce (Gongchangju) to check that
the company is only operating for the purposes laid down in its business
scope. Business scope determines not only the activities of companies, but
also their fiscal status. So a service company, whose business is subject to
the Business tax, does not have access to the VAT system (20) and is therefore
prevented from buying products for re-sale. Companies that engage in ac-
tivities falling outside their business scope run the risk of incurring sanctions
ranging from a simple fine to the withdrawal of their business licence, in a
context where denunciations to the department concerned are not un-
known. 
In addition to this verification of the business scope, a system of delivery
for permits and licences exists in many domains, allowing the authorities
to restrict the geographical area (for example, licences delivered province
by province for insurance activities) or to control the number of operators
in certain sectors (advertising, market surveys, and teaching, to name but
a few). The certification of products does not escape discretionary or dis-
criminatory practices.
The foreign exchange control is another obstacle foreign or foreign-in-
vested companies must face. WTO rules do not require total currency con-
vertibility of a member country, but simply the free convertibility of sums
corresponding to current operations (purchases of goods and services, pay-
ment of salaries and dividends in foreign currency, etc.). Within the space
of ten years, the purpose of foreign exchange controls has changed. Origi-
nally designed to prevent the escape of foreign currency, they are now
mainly used to protect China from incoming flows of foreign currency be-
cause of the constraints these movements place on Chinese currency. In
practice, the administrative difficulties the exchange control mechanisms
present for Chinese subsidiaries of foreign companies are legion: the impos-
sibility of cash advances to subsidiaries by the parent company (these must
take the form of shareholder loans, documented and registered with the
State Administration of Foreign Exchange), problems of financing develop-
ment operations in China other than by increases in capital (subject to ap-
proval), invoices from foreign service providers to Chinese entities paid late
or considered “too complex” by a Chinese client on the pretext of the ex-
change control, or the practical impossibility of transferring foreign capital
that has nonetheless been approved when the local exchange control bu-
reau has exhausted its annual quota of incoming currency and its civil ser-
vants risk being deprived of their bonuses if the quota is exceeded.
Guarantees in foreign currency are subject to the same preliminary regis-
tration system by the foreign exchange authorities as capital flows. They,
too, cause many problems, from the difficulty of a parent company to ex-
tend guarantees to the activities or borrowing of its Chinese subsidiary, to
the difficulty of setting up a seller’s warranty in favour of foreign purchasers
of companies, and including the difficulty for a foreign company or bank to
take out a mortgage or any other kind of security in China.
Tools of resistance to the opening up of the market
Given that a “WTO spirit” that would lead the authorities to open up ac-
cess to the market as a whole has not taken root in China, what tools have
they used to resist the demands and initiatives of foreign companies? Even
though these tools often take many forms, they all possess a certain sub-
tlety that generally prevents identification of a flagrant violation of the
commitments taken at the time of accession or in relation to the rules of
the WTO.
A first tool is the application of the principle of national treatment. A com-
plexity applicable to Chinese companies is equally applicable to foreign-
owned companies, even if it prevents the latter from effectively accessing
the market. Construction is one of the sectors in which the application of
national treatment has led, in practice, to the exclusion of very many foreign
operators. The Ministry of Construction has set up checks on the aptitude
of entities authorised to work on construction projects by delivering A, B,
or C qualification licences depending on the technical difficulty of the proj-
ect, with sub-categories applicable to certain kinds of work. The system ap-
plies to construction companies themselves as well as to firms specialising
in architecture, engineering, technical controls, and project management.
The WTO Accession Protocol made provision for a degree of opening up of
the construction sector to foreign-owned companies, but the latter find
that most of the time they are barred from taking part in the projects that
interest them, which are generally those requiring a Grade A licence. The re-
quirements for obtaining – and keeping – the licence include, for example,
a minimum number of qualified engineers and technicians, a minimum level
of registered capital, and a portfolio of similar completed projects. (21) These
criteria apply to all Chinese or foreign-owned companies, but just as it is
easy for a Chinese architecture or engineering practice to justify an existing
team and project portfolio, it is difficult for a foreign firm to justify experi-
ence that would qualify them for the job when only work done in China is
accepted by the authorities in charge of examining the application for qual-
ification. Lack of qualifying experience in China means no licence; no licence
means no chance to build up a portfolio of qualifying experience and there-
fore no real access to the market.
Exclusion from the market for lack of a local partner is another resistance
tool. An illustration of this can be found in the telecommunications sector,
in which American and European negotiators fought hard for their operators
to have a chance to access the market within the framework of joint ven-
tures, in a context where the projects of foreign operators within the frame-
work of CCF (China-China-Foreign) projects had just been dismantled by
order of the national authorities. (22) These companies could only be set up
with Chinese partners in possession of a telephone operator’s licence, and
since the three companies already in the sector were keen to preserve their
monopoly, it has never been possible to set up a Sino-foreign joint venture
to offer either fixed or mobile telephone services, and no foreign operator
can hope to do business in this sector in China, whilst value-added telecom-
munications services, which are on the whole defined and supervised by the
Ministry of Information Industry, are also by and large closed. (23)
Differentiated application of the regulations constitutes a third tool iden-
tified as a major obstacle by European companies questioned by the Euro-
pean Chamber of Commerce. (24) Foreign-owned companies have become
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20. At least until the introduction of VAT on service activities, the implementation of which has already
begun in Shanghai for services with high added-value, and which is expected to be extended. 
21. European Business in China Position Paper 2011/2012, Construction Working Group, pp. 216-217.
22. CCF (China-China-Foreign) projects had been established by foreign operators in collaboration
with Chinese operators in the shape of wholly foreign-owned service companies that financed
the investments of the Chinese operators and invoiced technical services that enabled them, under
the terms of a contract, to share risks and income. These projects, approved by the Ministry of
Commerce, were declared “irregular” by the Ministry of Information Industry in October 1988.
23. European Business in China Position Paper 2011/2012, Information and Technology Working
Group, p. 225.
24. “The discretionary enforcement of broadly drafted laws and regulations” is a major regulatory
obstacle for 46 percent of the European companies questioned in the annual survey on the busi-
ness confidence of European companies present in China, carried out by the European Chamber
of Commerce in China in association with Roland Berger in 2011.
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accustomed, over many long years, to paying social contributions for em-
ployees whilst their Chinese competitors are often able, thanks to specific
agreements with the local authorities, to pay much lower flat-rate sums.
Since the promulgation of the law on labour contracts (25) and other texts
pertaining to social security cover, harmonisation is underway, with contri-
bution rates applicable to all. Nonetheless, after the start of the financial
crisis in 2008, many purely domestic companies suffering a slow-down in
their exports were consequently exempted from national laws that contin-
ued to apply to foreign-owned companies. Foreign-owned factories are li-
able to find themselves paying fines for the non-respect of environmental
regulations and receiving orders to bring their establishments up to stan-
dard, whilst neighbouring competitors emitting far greater and more dan-
gerous polluting substances escape all sanctions. Foreign insurance firms
complain that restrictions imposed on the distribution of insurance products
by the banking networks (which, since they generate large commissions,
can only be implemented through agreements with banks at the central
level and not with their local branches) are applied differently to companies
depending on whether or not they are financed by foreign capital, and that
Chinese firms continue commissioning practices with local branches of
banks although the regulatory authority has already penalised foreign-
owned firms for these same practices.
These discriminatory practices are similar to those that make it difficult
to access the public procurement markets that are a top priority for the Eu-
ropean Union and the United States in their current discussions with
China. (26) Indeed, it can be seen that foreign companies or foreign-owned
companies can find themselves excluded from certain government con-
tracts or contracts launched by state-owned companies, even after investing
in local production capacity and adapting their products to Chinese norms.
Companies of European origin have, for example, complained of exclusion
from the gigantic wind-farm projects envisaged in China, particularly off-
shore. (27)
In the offshore wind-farm sector, the reasons given by the Chinese au-
thorities for insisting that foreign bidders are joint ventures with a majority
Chinese shareholding relate to the imperatives of national security. (28) The
concept of national security is a tool increasingly used to restrict access to
the market, preventing foreign companies from buying Chinese companies
in several business sectors (naturally including companies in the defence
sector as well as companies in certain key sectors of agriculture, energy and
resources, transport systems, and some manufacturing equipment sec-
tors). (29) It can also be seen in China’s standardisation policy, as well as in
many other areas, for example in the policy applicable to the encrypting of
information systems that covers both military and commercial uses and
obliges foreign manufacturers to reveal highly confidential information such
as that relating to the source codes of the encrypting system. (30)
China therefore makes full use of non-tariff barriers to protect its market
and favour its companies. Other member-states of the WTO do not hesitate
to use similar means to protect their markets or to evoke the imperatives
of national security to prevent foreign companies from acquiring certain
jewels in their industrial crown. The situation is, however, specific in China
because of the importance of the commercial stakes (local market prospects
nourish special expectations on the part of foreign companies) and the com-
petition Western companies increasingly face in their own markets and in
third markets from new Chinese challengers. They have the impression, often
well-founded, that there is no reciprocity in the access conditions to the
Chinese market and to the market in their country of origin. (31)
The principle of national treatment is at the very heart of WTO principles
and obliges a member-state to treat all companies, whether wholly Chinese
or with foreign capital, on equal terms. The nationality of a company has,
moreover, become a subject of debate in Europe, refuted by some who think
of themselves as “international.” For its part, China remains interested in
the nationality of its companies and has difficulty treating all companies in
the same way. If Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declared on 13 September 2010
that he “would like to reiterate that all enterprises registered in China in ac-
cordance with law are Chinese companies,” (32) it was because things are in
general seen differently both by most foreign investors and by many gov-
ernment departments and Chinese civil servants.
In point of fact, China’s policy is qualified by some as “Gaullist” in that its
aim is to acquire autonomy in most industrial sectors and launch its na-
tional champions into the conquest of world markets. To this end, China
does not hesitate to make technology transfers a condition of access to its
own markets and to reserve subsidies and preferential terms of access to
bank finance for national companies. Anxious to support the rise of its in-
dustry and to encourage Research and Development, it has decreed a mul-
tiform policy of “indigenous innovation.” Although the Chinese government
has renounced restricting access to public markets to products on the list
of “indigenous innovations” it has drawn up, the practices of the authorities,
in particular local authorities, often seem different to foreign operators.
Without being naive about the measures many other countries also take
to favour their own companies, the relationship between the principle of
national treatment and the legitimacy of China’s economic development
policy would nonetheless seem to raise many questions.
Possible improvements or structural
obstacles?
In the light of the above, is there any room for improvement to ensure
that the principles of transparency, national treatment, and judicial review
that structure the WTO’s approach are better respected? In other words,
must we believe that the malfunctioning of the market, the lack of respect
for intellectual property, corruption, and the absence of a reliable court sys-
tem will disappear as China’s economic development and modernisation
program progress, or do we find ourselves in a specific situation leading us
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25. PRC Labour Contract Law of 29 June 2007, which came into force on 1 January 2008.
26. Negotiations under way on China’s adherence to the WTO’s Public Markets Agreement (WTO
GPA).
27. European Business in China Position Paper 2011/2012, Renewable Energy Working Group, p. 196.
28. Idem, p. 196.
29. Provisions on the Acquisition of Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors (2006) mentions pos-
sible checks on the grounds of national security, formalised in a Circular issued by the State Council
on 5 March 2011 (Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Establishing a Security
Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors). The
practice of merger control, begun in 2003 and implemented in practice with the coming into
force of the Anti-monopoly Law of 1 August 2008, has not so far dissipated suspicions that it is
being used as a form of economic protectionism. 
30. “Information security regulation in China is marked by heavy restrictions towards foreign market
access on the grounds of appeals to national security, as well as a lack of clarity and transparency,”
European Business in China Position Paper 2011/2012, Information Security Industry Working
Group, p. 229.
31. “Compared to its major trading partners, China is by far the most restricted in foreign investment,
both in restricting and in requiring approval of individual investments rather than simple regis-
tration or notification. Since China is now growing rapidly as a foreign direct investor, the lack of
reciprocity will certainly lead to friction.” Christian Murck, President of the American Chamber of
Commerce in China (AmCham China), on the Tenth Anniversary of China’s WTO Accession, Caixin,
11 January 2012.
32. “China’s Wen Promises Fair Play for Foreign Investors,” 13 September 2010, Reuters.
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to believe that as a result of political and cultural obstacles, China will re-
main a special case in international trade relations?
The case of intellectual property
Intellectual property has been a focus of attention for China’s main partners
for many years now, since China is seen as the number one country for coun-
terfeit goods. Accession to the WTO has closed the gap that existed between
Chinese legislation and the principles figuring in the rules of the WTO. (33)
Well-known marks are now recognised, and the registration of three-dimen-
sional trademarks has been authorised. But have things really changed? We
can credit the Chinese authorities with conducting more anti-counterfeiting
campaigns than before, of attempting to develop a sense of product quality
amongst consumers, and of understanding the economic usefulness of brand
protection. However, commercial parasitism remains endemic alongside
counterfeit goods that continue to affect Chinese and foreign products alike. 
Without carrying out a technical analysis of these questions, which is be-
yond the scope of this article, we can highlight a deviation from the mean-
ing of intellectual property such as it figures in the treaty regime set up at
the end of the nineteenth century and to which China adhered. Admittedly,
the system of patent protection has been called into question at world level,
in particular for products such as pharmaceutical drugs from which the most
underprivileged populations are excluded. But it is in China that the most
widespread criticisms are developing concerning the market power obtained
by international companies through their intellectual property rights. More-
over, the very purpose of a patent as temporary protection for a discovery
or of trademarks as protection of the prestige of a product would seem to
be challenged by the practices of Chinese companies, sometimes with the
complicity of the trademark and patents offices. Foreign companies that
respect the principle of patent claims limited to patentable inventions (no-
tably with regard to the prerequisite of novelty) are put at a disadvantage
in comparison with Chinese companies who manage to register – and main-
tain – a far wider field of claims before attacking foreign companies on the
grounds of counterfeiting. Verification of the novelty contained in the patent
application, which Chinese examiners have been obliged to carry out since
2009, does not prevent certain Chinese companies from registering patents
for inventions that have fallen into the public domain abroad. The tax ad-
vantages applicable to technology-advanced enterprises, which must be jus-
tified by at least two registered patents, has led to a trade in artificial
patents that partly puts into perspective the sharp increase in the number
of patents registered in China in recent years. Well-known marks, which are
the object of recognition by the government or by the tribunals, have be-
come a marketing tool used by hitherto largely unknown Chinese brands,
to the point where the Chinese authorities have sought to limit the possi-
bilities for recognition of well-known marks by the tribunals.
So are these deviations from the spirit of the international intellectual
property protection system a sign of the immaturity of the Chinese market,
which will progressively disappear, or the sign of a conception of intellectual
property that is specific to China and therefore here to stay? There are many
arguments to support either thesis.
Playing with the rules
Problems of applying the regulations regarding intellectual property are
in line with other observations on legal practices in China. These often give
the impression that the rule of law is less the framework for fair commercial
transactions than a tool with which certain parties can play better than
others. In most countries, there are numerous, sometimes over-complex
rules, but principles lie behind the law and allow the judge to signal the end
of the game when one party tries to play too much on the letter of the law
in order to circumvent its spirit. In China, the regulations are similarly ex-
tensive, sometimes even more technical and complex in order to deal with
the problems arising from rapid economic development, and are sometimes
purposely vague in order to leave the administrative authorities sufficient
room to manoeuvre. Frequently however, the approach adopted by Chinese
companies, the departments concerned, or the tribunals demonstrates a
purely functional idea of the ruling, detached from the principals that should
animate it.
The Danone/Wahaha case is fairly representative in this respect. Without
knowing all the ins and outs of the situation, (34) it is clear that Danone had
acquired 51 percent of the capital of Wahaha in the mid-1990s, and that
following a disagreement between Wahaha’s founder, Zong Qinghou, who
wanted to develop use of the brand name for other products outside the
joint venture company, and Danone, who hoped to prevent this, several pro-
ceedings were launched both inside and outside China. The case, which led
to widespread debate on the Internet, could not be settled under the aegis
of the Chinese and French public authorities, leading Danone to sell its
shares after ending the arbitration procedure it had launched. In fact, it tran-
spired that it was not possible for Danone to exercise its majority share-
holder rights, that Chinese public opinion, without taking into account the
initial agreement, was squarely behind a Chinese shareholder facing up to
a foreign multinational, and that the principle of the binding nature of con-
tracts gave way in the face of the idea that a foreign shareholder who
merely profited from the growth of the business of the company in which
he had invested was not legitimate in forbidding the Chinese manager to
apply the policy of his choice.
In this case as in others, it can be seen that the very idea of a contract
does not, in practice, mean the same thing in China as in Europe. It is not
the legal provisions that are in question (the Chinese law of contracts is
close to that of continental Europe), but their application. The contract is
not, as one might expect, so much a document that sets down the expec-
tations of the parties, as it is a framework for their relationship that must
evolve as circumstances change. Hence the constant renegotiations and a
certain measure of “good faith” on the part of the Chinese side in their re-
fusal to apply such and such clause of a contract. (35)
Chinese judges are increasingly professional, but obliged to work in a way
that does not guarantee their independence. The tribunals can sometimes
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33. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).
34. The parties ended their conflict by a transactional protocol that almost certainly contained a
confidentiality clause preventing them from testifying in what must have nonetheless been a
textbook case of the state of relations between Chinese and foreign partners in a joint venture.
We know that the initial acquisition contract mentioned a transfer of the trademark to the joint
venture that did not take place for reasons relating to the Chinese administrative authorities and
that in the meantime, a licence contract ordered the conditions under which the trademark could
be used by the joint venture. The clauses pertaining to the settlement of disputes, which differ
from contract to contract, led to the opening of international arbitration proceedings in Stockholm
on the basis of the joint venture contract and internal arbitration proceedings in Hangzhou on
the basis of the trademark licence.
35. To take one example amongst many, a European company that had signed a joint venture contract
with a Chinese partner 15 years previously that included a clause forbidding the Chinese partner
to enter into competition with the joint venture, took the said partner to task over its avowed
disrespect of this clause, and found itself offered the possibility of simply erasing the clause so
that the contract would be in conformity with this new reality.
Hubert Bazin – Transparency and National Treatment under the Chinese Flag
become, through various forms of pressure, the tool of local protectionism,
reducing the effectiveness of the judicial review stated in the rules of the
WTO. Foreign or foreign-owned companies are loath to ask a Chinese judge
to settle commercial differences and prefer compromise and discussion to
the risk of prejudicial or biased legal proceedings. They almost never act
against the government, even when it does not respect its rules. They often
agree to pay unjustified fines and to submit to abusive injunctions rather than
contest administrative decisions in the courts, fearing to give themselves a
bad image or even to suffer retaliatory measures if they embark on this path.
These observations, which are not isolated examples, represent the situ-
ation of the rule of law in China ten years after its accession to the WTO,
with progress in a context that lacks transparency, the rule of law often
being used solely to protect local and national interests. It was doubtless
illusory to think that China’s access to the WTO was going to bring about
sudden change in the Chinese administrative and legal system. Questions
remain to be answered, notably on the possibilities for improving the busi-
ness framework in China with regard to the fair application of rules, admin-
istrative transparency, national treatment, and effective judicial review,
which appear in the rules of the WTO. Some observers recommend patience
to allow China to modernise its traditions as it progressively integrates into
world trade, confident that the country’s rapid economic development will
one day end in a harmonisation of rules and practices. Others, however, are
more circumspect, asking themselves if China has not exhausted all possi-
bility of improvement under its current system, and if future improvements
are possible so long as the regime has not found any way to achieve real
political reform. (36) It is interesting to note that these differences in analysis
between the “optimists” and the “pessimists” can be found both in foreign
companies in China and amongst the Chinese themselves.
To look at the modernisation of China from the legal point of view is nec-
essarily to be impressed by the efforts made to build, almost from scratch,
a relatively comprehensive legal system. Yet experience of the practice of
law in China also brings its share of disappointments and frustration in the
face of the often inoperable nature of the rule of law.
Ten years ago, China demanded its accession to the WTO as part of its
status as a great power in the making. Its argument of a WTO incomplete
without the presence of one of the great players of world trade was ac-
cepted by the member-states, who nonetheless sought guarantees and
compensations in the form of access to the market and reductions in cus-
toms duties. In ten years, the international context has changed remarkably.
More than any other country, China has benefited from the globalisation
of trade, but must face an increase in labour costs and the reorientation of
its economic system towards growth that is more respectful of natural re-
sources and directed more towards its domestic market. The model repre-
sented by Western countries was damaged by the financial crisis of 2008,
whilst the managerial classes face increasingly strong pressure in favour of
de-globalisation and a return to forms of protectionism. Today’s view is that
the harmonisation of the rules of world trade cannot be achieved simply
by transplanting a “Western” system, and the need for international regu-
lation remains more urgent than ever. In this context, we would like the
Chinese players, who are also confronted with difficulties in accessing the
markets of Western countries and with new problems of managing sub-
sidiaries abroad, to be able to suggest possibilities for development and the
harmonisation of practices. These can only be credible, however, if they are
founded on greater reciprocity.
z Translated by Elizabeth Guill
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36. Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, by confirming in his report dated 11
March 2011 the maintenance of a “legal system of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and
refusing the Western idea of the separation of powers, illustrates the attitude of those who refuse
all radical developments.
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